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PUBLIC WELFARE "WIN" PROGRAM:
ARM-TWISTING INCENTIVES
Congress has recently enacted a wide range of public welfare
changes in title II of the Social Security Amendments of 1967.' The
federal social security program has provided grants-in-aid for the
partial financing of welfare relief for specific categories of disadvantaged
persons.' One of these categories is Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC).' AFDC has been most prominently amended in
the new changes by the creation of the Work Incentive Program
(WIN)." This program requires that appropriate AFDC recipients
who are at least sixteen years old be referred to the Secretary of Labor
for participation in employment, or in job training.' Refusal to par-
ticipate without good cause results in removal from AFDC rolls.'
WIN is heralded by its draftsmen as an opportunity to give participants
"a sense of dignity, self worth, and confidence which will flow from
being recognized as a wage-earning member of society. . . ."7
Although the goal is desirable, this Comment will demonstrate that the
compulsory nature of the program and its complex structure make
its achievement doubtful.
I. BACKGROUND OF WIN
The WIN program's predecessor was the AFDC-UP community
work and training program, created by the 1961 8 and 1962 9 amend-
1 Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, tit. II, 81 Stat. 877, amending 42 U.S.C.
§§ 601-1396 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-1396 (Supp. III, 1968)).
2 Grants-in-aid programs probably serve as the major form of welfare relief
today. They are financed by both federal and state governments. See Wedemeyer &
Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 326, 327-29, 333 (1966).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (Supp. 11, 1968). Dependent children are those who are
"deprived of parental support or care by reason of the death, continued absence from
the home, or physical or mental incapacity of a parent . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1)
(Supp. III, 1968). The children must be living with a parent or relative. Id.
4 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19), 630-644 (Supp. III, 1968). WIN is perhaps the
most controversial of the 1967 Amendments. See Hearings on H.R. 12080 Before the
Senate Finance Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 781 (1967) (testimony of the
late Senator Robert F. Kennedy); id. pt. 3, at 1776-79 (testimony of Professor
Edward V. Sparer).
5See 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19) (A), 632(b) (Supp. III, 1968).
642 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (Supp. III, 1968).
7 Id. § 630. It is also expected that "the example of a working adult in [AFDC]
families will have beneficial effects on the children in such families." Id.
S Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 75, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§607 (Supp. III, 1968). Federal aid to the states under the new program was
optional. To avail themselves of it, the states had to meet extra requirements in the
plan they submitted for federal approval. Id.
9 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §§ 104(a) (3) (E),
131(a), 134, 76 Stat. 185, 193, 196, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §607 (Supp. III, 1968).
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ments to the Social Security Act."0 The AFDC program had previ-
ously been limited to supplying funds to children deprived of parental
support because of the absence or incapacity of a parent. The amend-
ments extended it to homes in which the parent was present due to
unemployment. However, receipt of such relief was conditioned on
acceptance by the parent of any available employment or job training.
At the same time, provision was made for the incorporation of com-
munity work and training programs for the new unemployed recipients
into the AFDC program."
Writing in 1966, Margaret K. Rosenheim concluded that the
range of employment and training opportunities offered to AFDC-UP
recipients was unsatisfactory.' 2 Although some attempts were made by
the statute to ensure that the work would be useful,' 3 Rosenheim argues
that in practice the overall policy was aimed more toward punishing the
idle than toward making a serious attempt at the economic rehabilita-
tion of welfare recipients:
A review of various work and training programs designed
for assistance recipients identifies features more readily ex-
plained as reflections of dislike of idleness than of the unique
requirements of the population in the recipient status. 4
Instead of motivating recipients to work by supplying them with
sufficient and immediate financial incentives, as well as work or train-
ing that would tend to have a beneficial effect on their long term
employment prospects, the old AFDC-UP program limited itself to
bludgeoning recipients into work of dubious utility by threatening the
withdrawal of payments.
The principal fault in the old AFDC program was its almost total
failure to provide work incentives. The only substantial income the
state agency was obliged to disregard when it determined the need
of AFDC recipients was the $150 per month of the earned income of
a child under the age of 18. Since there might be several children in
one home, a limit of $150 per month per home was placed on the
10 These programs did not represent the introduction of work requirements to
welfare programs in the United States. Many states provide for employment of
paupers in their general assistance codes or in their aid to dependent children statutes.
See e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. Rr~v. § 17-281a (1968) ; IND. ANN. STAT. § 52-152 (1964) ;
MICH. Comp. LAws § 400.55a(d) (1967) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 405 (1968). For
a discussion of some historical work requirements, see tenfroek, California's
Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN.
L. REv. 257, 258-91 (1964).
'1 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, §105(a), 76
Stat. 186.
12 See Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 511,
531-41 (1966).
13 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 105(a), 76 Stat. 186.
14Rosenheimn, mtpra note 12, at 541.
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amount that could be disregarded in this manner. 5 In addition, the
state agency was permitted to disregard five dollars per month per
recipient, as well as any part of the income of the home that was
being set aside for future needs of the dependent child.'" Therefore,
under this policy, if an unemployed recipient found work, whatever he
gained from his earnings, he lost in a corresponding reduction of AFDC
benefits (except in the case of a dependent child). His only incentive
to work was the threat to withdraw payments if he refused to do
so. Similarly, the creation of AFDC community work and training
programs in 1962 neglected to supply an affirmative incentive for re-
cipients to engage in such programs.'
The Work Incentive Program was intended to remedy the almost
total failure of the old AFDC program to provide work incentives.
However, the title of the program may have included the word incentive
a little too freely, for it will eventually be demonstrated that WIN, in
very subtle ways, compels AFDC recipients to work, or train for work,
more than it provides incentives to do so.
II. OPERATION OF THE WIN PROGRAM
As part of the state plan (which must be submitted for federal
approval) the 1968 amendment creating the WIN program requires a
provision that the state agency promptly refer AFDC recipients to the
representative of the Secretary of Labor for participation in a WIN
program, if they think the recipient is "appropriate." 18 They are then
screened for placement into one of three programs provided for by the
statute.' Enrollees are placed in the highest level program (or
"priority," as the Labor Handbook refers to it) for which they are
suited. The three programs are (1) employment or on-the-job train-
ing; (2) for less advanced recipients, "a program of institutional and
work experience training" designed to prepare participants for regular
employment; and (3) "a program of special work projects for indi-
viduals for whom a job in the regular economy cannot be found." 20
Before describing these programs and the incentives accompanying
them, it should be noted, that while a new incentive system has
been instituted, the old negative incentive of withdrawal of payments
for refusal to participate in the programs has been retained, although
1542 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (Supp. II, 1967), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7)
(Supp. III, 1968).
'1 Id.
17 Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, § 105, 76 Stat. 186.
1842 U.S.C. §602(a) (19) (Supp. III, 1968).
1942 U.S.C. § 632(b) (Supp. III, 1968).
20 Id.
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in a milder form. Under the old AFDC-UP program, refusal by the
unemployed parent to accept employment or retraining necessitated
denial of AFDC payments to the child. Thus the child might be
denied aid through no fault of his own."1 Under the new law, if any
recipient refuses to participate in a WIN program, his needs may not
be taken into account in making the determination with regard to the
home of which he is a member." Thus, while other members of the
home are still indirectly penalized, no recipients are directly denied relief
through the fault of others.
The first program provides for placement in employment or
on-the-job training. Not many enrollees are likely to find their way
into this program immediately. To be placed immediately into employ-
ment, it must be "definitely established that the enrollee is able to get
and hold a job." ' For on-the-job training, the enrollee must have
the following requisites: "(1) Good basic work habits. (2) A func-
tional educational level (at least basic education) necessary to under-
stand training. (3) Familiarity with the occupational area." I The
incentive provided for participants in the first priority is an earnings
exemption in computing AFDC need of the first thirty dollars and one-
third of the remainder of each month's wages." The senate report
pointed out that title VII of the Economic Opportunity Act provided
for disregarding the first eighty-five dollars a month and one-half of
the remainder for the purposes of public assistance under the first three
titles of that Act.2" The version which passed the Senate would have
permitted disregarding the first fifty dollars per month and one-half
of the remainder, but this was abandoned in conference.2
The Labor Handbook distinguishes various types of training
within the second priority, including work internship, institutional
vocational training, sub-professional training, and work experience."8
2 Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, 75 Stat. 76, as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§ 607 (Supp. III, 1968); Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543,
§ 134, 76 Stat. 196, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. III, 1968) ; see Rosenheim,
supra note 12, at 532.
2242 U.S.C. § 607(19) (F) (Supp. III, 1968).
= Manpower Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Work Incentive Program Handbook
§ 511G(1) (b) (July 25, 1968) [hereinafter cited as LABOR HANDBOOK].
24 LABOR HANDBOOK § 514 1(C). The existence of this program suggests that
the legislators assumed that there would be some recipients unemployed merely
because of their reluctance to work. An alternative explanation for their unemploy-
ment might be discrimination by employers. § 534(B) (2) (a) of the LABOR HANDBOOK
forbids discrimination in the administration of the WIN program, and § 416 provides
a grievance procedure for complaints (about discrimination among other things)
"within the power of the WIN sponsor to change." Nevertheless the legislation does
not reach discriminatory hiring practices in general on the part of employers.
2Z42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (8) (A) (II) (Supp. III, 1968) ; LABoR HANDBOOK § 407(C).
26S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2834, 2994 (1967).
27 Id. at 2995.
28 LABOR HANDBOOK §§ 5142-.5.
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In addition to their regular welfare payments, participants in these
programs receive an incentive payment of thirty dollars per month.'
The senate report unsuccessfully suggested incentive payments of
twenty dollars per week,"0 which, in addition to ten dollars per week ex-
penses, is the rate for participants in the Manpower Development and
Training Act's institutional training program" l
Although the special work projects under the third priority are
considered the least desirable alternative, they could also produce in-
novative methods for helping the hard-core unemployed. These special
work projects are to provide low-skilled or unskilled jobs which serve a
public purpose, and at the same time, do not displace workers in the
regular economy.32 Recipients with marketable skills, but for whom suit-
able employment cannot be found in the regular economy, are temporar-
ily enrolled in this programY Indefinite enrollment exists for those
who, because of physical impairment or mental incapacity, for example,
cannot benefit from training programs." Every six months the employ-
ment situation of all project employees is reviewed for the purpose of
transferring as many employees as possible to other WIN programs."
The incentive provided under the third priority is a total income of at
least the amount of the welfare grant to which the project participant's
family has been entitled, plus twenty per cent of the wages paid by the
employer."6 Participants receive a wage from their employer instead
of a welfare grant, 7 the statute guaranteeing it be at the minimum
wage rate required by law, if applicable to their jobs.""
It should be noted that Labor Department regulations demand that
referral agencies be able to produce an "objective justification" for
29 42 U.S.C. § 634 (Supp. III, 1968).
30 S. REP. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2834, 2985 (1967).
31 
LABOR HANDBOOK § 514.3(D).
32 LABOR HANDBOOK § 514.6.
3342 U.S.C. § 633(h) (Supp. III, 1968).
3 4 
LABOR HANDBOOK § 514.6(C) (1).
3542 U.S.C. §633(h) (Supp. III, 1968).
36 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (E) (Supp. III, 1968).
37 Legislative history suggests Congress believed the wage form of payment would
contribute significantly toward helping participants acquire a sense of dignity and
self-worth. This wage is subject to income, social security, and other taxes. S. REP.
No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 2834,
2994-96 (1967). .
38 42 U.S.C. § 633(e) (4) (Supp. III, 1968). Special work projects are developed
by the Labor Department's Bureau of Work Training Programs through contracts
with public agencies and private nonprofit agencies organized for a public purpose.
Id. § 633(e). Each project contract is negotiated separately in order to obtain from
each employer the wage payment which fairly represents the value of the participant's
service to that employer. Where the value of the services the employer receives does
not equal the employee's wage, state welfare monies make up the difference. See id.
§§ 602(a) (19) (E), 633(e) (3).
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placement of welfare recipients in the special work project program."9
This requirement should be strictly applied, for although the special
work project may provide a means of employing the supposed "unem-
ployables," dead-end enrollment of the trainable or the skilled re-
cipient will be just as debilitating as continued unemployment. Further-
more, this objective justification requirement should also be extended
to require that the semi-annual evaluation justify any continued par-
ticipation in this program. In this manner, dead-end enrollment could
be spotted and terminated periodically.
A realistic analysis of the incentive program uncovers flaws in its
logic. Even the incentives in the highest priority amount to no more
than an exemption in computing AFDC need of the first thirty dollars
plus one-third of the remainder of each month's wages.4" This is far
short of the minimal standards suggested in the senate report (that is,
the first eighty-five dollars a month and one-half of the remainder-the
sum used in computing public assistance in title VII of the Economic
Opportunity Act).41
Complementing the hollow incentives within the program are
the disturbing potentialities for coercion in the referral system. A
thorough examination of this aspect reveals that the program could
actually intimidate and compel recipients into working or training for
work, rather than luring them into the job market. This could come
about both overtly through the sanctions for refusal to participate,42
and covertly by the myriad of regulations and the possibilities of case-
workers exercising subtle pressures upon recipients. Therefore, the
combination of the sparse monetary incentives and the vexing potential
for compulsion would appear to forecast a return to the poor laws that
were frowned upon in western civilization centuries ago.
43
Referral Process
As a prerequisite to receiving federal AFDC grants after July 1,
1969,44 every state must have a welfare administration plan providing
for the prompt referral of eligible individuals by local welfare agencies
to the local state or Department of Labor employment office for enroll-
39 LABOR HANDBOOK § 514.6.
4 0 Text accompanying note 25.
4 1 Text accompanying note 26.
4242 U.S.C. §602(a) (19) (F) (Supp. III, 1968).
43 Before the 1935 Social Security Act, relief laws for the poor were direct
descendants of the Elizabethan Poor Law of 1601, which contained work requirements
for the poor and idle. 43 Eliz. 1, c. 2 (1601). For a discussion of early poor laws,
see tenBroek, m.pra note 10.
44 State AFDC plan requirements went into effect July 1, 1968, unless a state had
a statute preventing compliance on that date; then the state was required to adopt a
plan no later than July 1, 1969. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248, § 210 (a) (2).
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ment in a WIN program.' Those AFDC recipients who are not
involuntarily referred by their local welfare agency may volunteer for
referral unless the referring agency believes their employment would
be inimical to their well-being or to that of their family.46
The operative factor in this referral process is the local welfare
agency's determination of a recipient's eligibility for referral. The
federal statute requires that state welfare agencies, under the guidance
of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), refer
all individuals sixteen years of age or older who receive AFDC aid
or who live with an AFDC recipient and whose needs are taken into
account in determining the amount of the welfare payment, and all
recipients who volunteer for referral.4' The statute makes ineligible
for referral those who are ill, incapacitated or advanced in age, live
so far from a WIN program that they cannot effectively participate,
attend school full time, or must remain in the home because of the
illness or incapacity of another member of the household.4" Once
eligibility has been established, recipients are referred to WIN pro-
grams under a referral priority established by the HEW.49 The welfare
agency must first refer unemployed fathers receiving AFDC-UP assist-
ance and AFDC unemployed fathers currently participating in a
Community Work and Training Program or in a Work Experience
and Training Program under title V of the Economic Opportunity
Act.50 Next in priority for referral are (1) other AFDC unemployed
fathers, (2) AFDC mothers and other caretaker relatives who volunteer
for referral and are currently participating in federally subsidized work
training programs, (3) AFDC mothers and others who volunteer and
who have no pre-school children, (4) AFDC mothers who volunteer
and have pre-school children, and lastly (5) "any other AFDC re-
cipients determined by the . . . Agency to be appropriate for referral.
This includes mothers who do not volunteer whether or not they have
pre-school children." 51
The potential severity of the last referral group presents difficult
problems. It should be noted, however, that HEW has instructed
local welfare agencies, who are responsible for making child-care ar-
45 LABOR HANDBOOK § 511.
4642 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (A) (iii) (Supp. III, 1968).
47 Id. § 602(a) (19) (A) (i)-(iii).
4 8 Id. § 602(a) (19) (A) (iv)-(vii).
49 HEW Interim Policy Issuance 1, Reg. A(2) (a), 33 Fed. Reg. 10026 (1968).
HEW priorities have been adopted by the LABOR HANDBOOK § 406.
5 0 
LABOR HANDBOOK § 406. The Community Work and Training Program author-
ized by the Social Security Amendments of 1965 and the work-training program
authorized by Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act will be phased out after a
WIN program is established in a given locality. Id. § 407(D).
51 LABOR HANDBOOK § 406.
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rangements and for providing supportive social services to WIN par-
ticipants, not to refer mothers of pre-school children unless a suitable
child care plan is actually available. Despite this gesture of "concern,"
taking family members out of the house, and in the case of unwilling
mothers, away from their children, could be disastrous to the family
structure. 2 The removal of mothers from the home also undercuts an
announced purpose of AFDC to "help maintain and strengthen family
life and to help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability
for the maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with
the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection.
In addition, the ability of the caseworker to influence the AFDC
recipient presents potential danger that those mothers "volunteering"
to work (thus falling in one of the middle three referral groups) may
really be doing so involuntarily. When a caseworker decides that the
AFDC mother should work, both formal and informal pressures can
overwhelm her genuine reluctance to leave her children in the hands
of the available day-care agency. Informally, the caseworker has great
power over welfare recipients. The mother realizes the need to remain
on welfare assistance, and knows this caseworker will make other
decisions in the future that affect her standard of living. The mother
must weigh her on-going relationship with the caseworker against the
possibility that she might be able to remain at home by "going over
his head." " This informal pressure to acquiesce in a determination
of eligibility, or even to volunteer for referral, can be mitigated only
if caseworkers give full consideration to the injurious effects of taking
the mother away from pre-school children.
Some protection from the pressures of the caseworker is provided
by the statutory provision that voluntary referral is not to be granted
if the state agency determines that participation "would be inimical to
the welfare of such person or the family." "' This can serve as a
guide by which welfare agency caseworkers can measure the appro-
priateness of a voluntary referral. Unfortunately, such a guide does
not also exist for determining eligibility for involuntary referral. Its
absence provides little assistance to caseworkers to consider all factors
relevant to the particular individual in making the referral decision.
6 2 See Hearings on, H.R. 12080 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., pt. 3, at 1776-79 (1967) (testimony of Professor Sparer). The Senate
attempted to exclude mothers of pre-school children and "persons whose participation
in the program would not (as determined by the State agency) be in their best interest
and in the interest of the program," S. Rm. No. 744, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1967) ;
but the Conference Committee rejected this amendment. CONF. REP. No. 1030, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nzws 3179, 3204 (1967).
53 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. III, 1968). WIN also seems to contradict the original
goals of the 1935 Social Security Act, which attempted to keep families intact by having
the mother remain at home with her children. See H.R. REP. No. 615, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10 (1935) ; S. REP. No. 628, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1935).
54 See Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54
CALI. L. REv. 493-95 (1966).
5542 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (A) (iii) (Supp. III, 1968).
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It might be argued that the AFDC recipient who is coerced into
volunteering for referral through pressures of the caseworker has the
further protection that volunteer referral subjects can withdraw with-
out the "good cause" required for withdrawal by involuntary par-
ticipants"' and without the fear of losing AFDC funds. However, the
same subtle pressures that coerced someone into volunteering, can
easily be a continual pressure on that person to stay within the program.
Therefore, statutory relief is only illusory.
III. REVIEW PROCEDURES
Finally, the recipient who refuses to participate within the pro-
gram must face the program's uncertain review procedures. The indi-
vidual who refuses to participate in WIN is entitled to a fair hearing
at two stages: the person referred to WIN can have a fair hearing
with the welfare department as to the "appropriateness" of the referral
and the "adequacy of child care facilities." '7 In addition, if after
referral an individual refuses the position offered him, he is entitled to
a fair hearing within the Labor Department on the issue of whether
he had "good cause" for refusal to work."
A. Referral Hearing
Neither the statute, the HEW Interim Policy Issuance regu-
lations nor the WIN handbook set out referral procedures to be fol-
lowed by state WIN plans. However, hearing requirements for other
state-administered public assistance programs, as prescribed in the
HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, apparently are
applicable to WIN referral hearings."
Federal regulations require that the state welfare administration
plans provide for notice to the referred claimant of his right to a
referral hearing, that hearing procedures be publicized and made avail-
able to the claimant and that the claimant be given "a clear under-
standing of what he needs to do to prepare for an effective presentation
of his case and to secure witnesses or legal counsel, if he desires." 6o
A recent regulation requires state welfare agencies to provide counsel
if requested.'l (Formerly, federal funds were available to states which
chose to provide legal assistance but the states were free to decide not
to provide counsel and to forego federal cost sharing.) 02 In addition,
5 6 See id. § 633(g).
57 HEW Interim Policy Issuance 1, Reg. A(16), 33 Fed. Reg. 10027 (1968).
6 42 U.S.C. § 633(g) (Supp. III, 1968); HEW Interim Policy Issuance 1, Reg.
A(17), 33 Fed. Reg. 10027 (1968).
59 U.S. Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, Handbook of Public Assistance
Administration, Pt. IV, Supp. B, § B-2472 [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL HANDBOOK].
60 FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Pt. IV, § 6333.
1 33 Fed. Reg. 17853 (1968).
02 FEDERAL HANDBOOK, Pt. IV, § 6335.
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federal financial participation is authorized to help pay "other costs,
expenditures, and fees reasonably related to the hearing." '
Although these general requirements of the hearing scheme which
are set out in the Federal Handbook are meritorious, states can exer-
cise wide discretion in implementing them. Thus the benefits of the
notice requirement could be defeated if the state made notice either
very general or too legalistic; in either case it would be of little use
to the recipient. The state's plan is to insure the claimant's right to
confront and cross-examine those who seek to uphold his referral; 4
but unless the members of the welfare agency who make the decision
of referral to WIN are required to appear at the welfare hearing, the
claimant will have no opportunity to refute their statements by cross-
examination.
Other difficulties also exist. To insure his protection, "non-
record or confidential information which the claimant does not have
an opportunity to hear or see may not be made a part of the hearing
or used in making a decision on the case." " This may result in the
claimant's inability to see his entire case record when it contains state-
ments favorable to him. Another problem is that recipients, fearing
reprisals by caseworkers, may decide not to challenge the referral at
all. Also, the agency making the referral is the hearing body which
passes on the appropriateness of referral. Problems arising from this
combination of functions could best be solved by promulgation through
regulations of a test for eligibility against which the agency's final
determination could be reviewed.
B. Refusal to Work Hearing
The Labor Handbook contains comprehensive administrative pro-
cedures designed to ensure that the enrollee is afforded adequate
opportunity to press his reasons for failure to satisfactorily participate
in the WIN program. At the outset, the WIN counselor is en-
couraged to make every effort to resolve the case informally as the
issues arise. To this end, the counselor is charged with the responsi-
bility for explaining to the enrollee the benefits of participation and
consequences of refusal, ascertaining the enrollee's true reasons for
refusal to participate, and evaluating the reasons given in light of a
possible good cause standard. 6 Following this determination, the
63 Id. § 6400(2) (C). Such funds may be available to reimburse and transport
claimant's witnesses who would otherwise be unavailable or reluctant to appear in
claimant's behalf.
64 See WiIlner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103 (1963):
We have emphasized in recent years that procedural due process often
requires confrontation and cross-examination of those whose word deprives
a person of his livelihood.
65 FEDERAL HANDBOOK, pt. IV, § 6337.
,G LABOR HANDBOOK § 412(F).
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WIN staff member is required to submit a notice to the enrollee ex-
plaining his findings, and in the event of an adverse result, advise him
of his rights to further review. 7 If the enrollee is dissatisfied he may,
within seven days, request reconsideration from a determination re-
view committee."8 This committee is afforded wide discretion con-
cerning the type and form of inquiry it may undertake, including the
power to order a de novo review.' Notice of the committee's find-
ings are then formally communicated to the enrollee who is advised
that if he does not demand a "fair hearing" within ten days the
decision will become final."
If the enrollee requests the "fair hearing" it is conducted by an
Unemployment Insurance referee, or other designated officer, in accord
with the procedures and rules that are applicable to disputed unem-
ployment insurance claims at the applicable state's first appeal level.7 '
At this hearing the enrollee is provided an opportunity to air his case
and employ counsel in his behalf, although WIN funds will not be
provided for that purpose.72 In the event of an adverse decision, the
enrollee is provided one final appeal, if taken within ten days, to the
regional director of the Bureau of Work Training Programs.73 This
is normally the final procedure available although the Secretary of
Labor may on his own motion take over the case at any time, in which
event his decision will be final and conclusive. 4
The success of the WIN enrollee's case turns on his ability to
establish "good cause." The Labor Handbook contains a list of sug-
gested criteria which the individual should be able to assert as good
cause."- Offered as examples of good cause for refusal of employment
are such general categories as "detrimental effects to the economic wel-
fare of the individual or to the family . . to the family life of the
6Id. §412(F) (1).
G6Id. § 412 (F) (2). The Determination Review Committee is a 3 member
panel consisting of one "familiar with jobs and skill requirements and one familiar
with the social and economic problems of WIN enrollees." Although not made a
mandatory requirement, it is recommended that the third member should be a "repre-
sentative of the poor," preferably one recommended by a local community action
agency. Id. § 412(G).
69Id § 412(G) (1).
70 Id. §§ 412(G) (1), 412(H).
•' Id. § 412(I) (1). For a comparison of the differing state procedures, see U.S.
Dept. of Labor, Manpower Admin., Bur. of Employment Security, Comparison
of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, BES No. U-141, Aug. 1967, at AT-7-8.
See also, Larson & Murray, The Development of Unemployment Insurance in the
United States, 8 VAND. L.R. 181 (1955).
72 LAOR HANDBOOK §412(G) (3) (c).
73 Id. §§ 412(1)(4), 412(J).
74 Id. § 412 (K).
75 Id. §§ 412 (E) (1) (a) -(o).
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individual . . .to the health or safety of the individual or to family
members." " These rather vague criteria make it difficult for the
claimant to challenge the agency determination. More certainty could
be provided, however, if the records of previous hearings which clarify
the scope of these general phrases were kept and made available."
State WIN proposals should also establish more effective criteria for
"good cause." The work refusal case law that has been developed by
the states may provide the additional assistance in establishing WIN
criteria as to "good cause" refusal. Indeed, the Federal Handbook of
Public Assistance Administration has urged development of such "good
cause for refusal" criteria for Community Work and Training Programs
based on the unemployment insurance model.
78
After this hearing, termination of welfare assistance is postponed
for sixty days while the state welfare agency provides intensive
counseling in an effort to persuade the claimant to participate in the
WIN program.7' If the claimant accepts these counseling services, his
needs during this period are computed in determining the family
assistance payment. But if the claimant refuses to participate at the
end of the period he is dropped from the family payment computation.80
Certainly the loss of aid for refusing to work without good cause ought
not to last indefinitely. The individual may become inappropriate
for referral because of changed circumstances or may leave the home,
or if the recipient agrees to participate, a renewal of payments should
ensue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The increasing growth of AFDC rolls exerted a major influence
on the House committee which drafted the 1967 Social Security
Amendments. In an effort to limit this expanding financial burden
the WIN program was devised to create a mandatory work situation
for AFDC recipients so that they would be able to contribute to their
16 Id. §§ 412 (E) (1) (m) -(o).
77 CAL. WELp. & INST'INS CODE § 10964 (West 1966). Recently a test case has
been brought to compliance with the FEDERAl. HANDBOOK, pt. IV, § 6 200(c), which
requires that state agencies "establish and maintain a method of informing, at least in
summary form, all local agencies of all fair hearing decisions by the hearing authority,
and the decisions . . . be accessible to the claimants, their representatives, and the
public.. . ." Little v. Montgomery, No. 592396 (Cal. Super. Ct., San Francisco Co.,
filed June 29, 1968), 14 WELF. L. BULL. 7 (Sept. 1968).
7 8 FE.RI HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 3462.23.
79 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (Supp. III, 1968).
80 If the individual refusing to participate is the only dependent child receiving
aid, all AFDC assistance terminates. If there is more than one dependent child, the
refusing child's needs will not be taken into account; the same result obtains if the
refusing individual is not an AFDC recipient. If, however, the refusal is by a
"relative" receiving AFDC funds, assistance for the family continues in the form of
vendor or protective payments or foster care during the 60-day counseling period
and thereafter. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (19) (F) (i)-(iii) (Supp. III, 1968).
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own support while simultaneously attempting to develop that sense of
dignity which normally attends personal employment. Although such
goals are commendable, the compulsive, non-incentive framework of the
program, the potential for disturbing important family ties, and the
difficulties in challenging agency determinations regarding eligibility,
all serve to make fruition of these aims doubtful. It is imperative that
these problems be tackled quickly and effectively if WIN is to con-
tribute in a positive sense to welfare programs, and not lead this
country back to a Elizabethan "poor law" environment.
